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SUMMARY QF ARGUMENT 
The Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that respondent's 
burn occurred within the "quasi-course of employment" is incor-
rect. Activities which come within the "quasi-course of employ-
ment " are activities that would not have been undertaken but for 
the compensable injury. A common example would be trips to the 
doctor for treatment. The respondent sustained the burns in 
question while he was working on his car, repairing a heater or 
cooking his meals, none of which, obviously, was necessitated by 
his industrial accident. Therefore, according to Professor 
Larson, because the injuries were not sustained in the "quasi-
course of employment11, they should be compensable only if the 
chain of causation leading from the industrial injury to the 
burn injury had not been broken by the injured employee's negli-
gence. Simple common sense tells us that the respondent had to 
know he had no feeling in his right hand and fingers. Moreover, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the respondent testified at the evidentiary hearing that he knew 
of the loss of feeling in his hand. He was, therefore, negligent 
t£S ie&3 locguitur in working around extremely hot equipment and 
surfaces without taking any protective measures. This negligence 
broke the chain of causation leading from the industrial accident 
to the burn injuries; therefore those injuries are not compen-
sable. 
AfiCTMENT 
POINT I. 
THE SUBSEQUENT INJURY TO THE RESPONDENT WAS 
NOT SUSTAINED IN THE "QUASI-COURSE OP EMPLOY-
MENT". 
The respondent did not sustain the burn injuries with which 
we are here concerned while he was in the quasi-course of his 
employment, "Quasi-course of employment" is a theory developed by 
Professor Larson. Larson defines quasi-course of employment as 
follows: 
Activities undertaken by the employee follow-
ing his injury which, although they take place 
outside the time and space limits of employ-
ment
 f would not be considered employment 
activities for usual purposes, are neverthe-
less related to employment in the sense that 
they are necessary, reasonable activities that 
would not have been undertaken but for the 
compensable injury, Larson, Vol. I, Section 
13.11(d). 
The Administrative Law Judge and the respondent completely ignore 
the language "that would not have been undertaken but for the 
compensable injury." Both misquote Larson as including activities 
which are merely "necessary and reasonable." They go on to point 
2 
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out that cooking is a necessary and reasonable activity* This is 
not the standard to be applied when determining if an injury is 
sustained during the quasi-course of employment and should, 
therefore, be compensable. 
The correct standard as described by Professor Larson 
requires that the activity be one that is necessitated by the 
industrial accident* As pointed out in appellant's brief, this 
includes such things as trips to the doctor to have the injury 
examined or treated. It clearly does not include working on cars, 
replacing heaters, or cooking. No stretch of the imagination 
could bring those activities into Larson's definition. The 
respondent's current injuries did not occur while he was engaged 
in the "quasi-course of employment", and, therefore, they are not 
compensable, irregardless of negligence, under this theory. 
POINT II 
THE CHAIN OP CAUSATION PROM THE PRIMARY 
INDUSTRIAL INJURY TO THE CURRENT INJURIES WAS 
BROKEN BY THE APPLICANT'S NEGLIGENCE. 
Because the respondent did not incur his injuries during a 
quasi-course of employment activity, those injuries should not 
be compensable due to the fact that the applicant's negligent 
conduct caused the injuries. 
Respondent states that Sullivan v. B & A Construction, Inc.. 
122 N.Y.S.2d 571, Rev'g. 307 N.Y. 161, 120 N.E.2d 694 (1954), is 
inapplicable to the instant case (Respondent's brief, p. 5). It 
is difficult to see how a case could be much more applicable. In 
Sullivan. an industrial injury caused the applicant's knee to 
3 
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occasionally lock. Despite the fact that his knee tended to 
lock and despite the fact that he knew it tended to lock, the 
applicant continued to drive his car. While driving his automo-
bile one day, the applicant's knee locked in such a manner as to 
deprive him of the use of his right leg. This resulted in an 
automobile accident wherein the applicant was injured. The Court 
denied compensation for those injuries on the basis that the 
applicant's own negligence, not the industrial injury, caused the 
accident. 
In the instant case, though the respondent had no feeling in 
his hand and knew he had no feeling in his hand, he proceeded to 
work around and with hot objects. It was the applicant's negli-
gence in working around hot objects and not the industrial injury 
which caused the burns to his hand. 
Completely ignoring the facts of the case, the respondent 
states, "Mr. McKean had no prior knowledge as to the loss of 
feeling or use in his arm and hand" (Respondent's brief, p. 6). 
This denies not only common sense, but the facts as they were 
testified to in the administrative hearing. At the administrative 
hearing, the respondent testified that he knew that his hand and 
arm were numb: 
Q. Now you testified that from the time of 
your injury your right arm had been somewhat 
numb; is that true? 
A. Well, I ain't had—there ain't no feeling 
in half of my hand. There's a little bit of 
feeling in the other half. 
Q. So is it fair to say that from your elbow 
4 
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to your thumb on that portion of your arm you 
are numb? 
A. Pretty much from the incision where my arm 
got cut off to my thumb. That way I ain't got 
no sensation or feeling. 
Q. And you obviously were aware of that from 
the date of your accident? 
A. Not really. I knew there was some but I 
didn't know to what extent. I didn't know 
howr or anything much about it. Cause see 
when I moved to Idaho I'd just got it back on 
and it was just beginning to grow back and day 
by day this side of my hand here was getting a 
little bit more feeling in it further up. 
Q. But you obviously knew you had sensation 
problems and didn't have good touch like in 
your left hand; is that true? 
A. Yeah. 0hf yeah. Definitely. 
Q. And you obviously had trouble holding onto 
things with your right hand? 
A. I couldn't even use my right hand at all. 
Couldn't hold nothing. I can't hold onto 
nothing unless I put it in there with my left 
hand. 
(R. 67-68) . The respondent obviously knew he had no feeling in 
his hand. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how he could not 
know. Both the respondent and the Administrative Law Judge make 
much of the fact that respondent's doctor told respondent that the 
feeling would return to his hand. This evidence is completely 
irrelevant. If a scar does not disappear, no patient would 
reasonably believe the scar was gone just because the doctor said 
it would disappear. Therefore, the optimism of the doctor should 
be ignored. The fact of the matter is the respondent's hand was 
5 
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numb at the time of the burn* On direct examination the respon-
dent testified: 
Q. Now the nature of those operations—What 
did they do to—Did they limit your sensation 
into your hand at all? 
A. Well, see, ever since I lost my armr I 
ainft had no feelings* I didn't have no 
feeling in my hand, I think it was just last 
year they had to go in my leg and cut a nerve 
out of my leg and put in my arm, just to get 
some of the feeling back in parts of my arm. 
Q. You did not have that nerve in your arm, 
though, at the time of the burn? 
A. I don't think so* I—Even if I did, it 
takes months for it to grow a centimeter or an 
inch, so it would of took a year anyways, even 
if I would have had it in there for it to grow 
(inaudible portion) out here to where I can 
feel it* And that's if it would of took. 
Like right now after they put it in, I still 
don't got no feeling sensation in my thumb. 
All that's there is like when your foot goes 
to sleep, it tingles. 
(R. 45, 46) . 
I t i s not clear whether the Administrative Law Judge found 
t ha t the applicant was not negligent. In his Findings of Pact, 
the Judge t a l k s about the "reasonableness" of the respondent's 
a c t i v i t i e s . He uses the terms "reasonable" and "necessary" when 
discuss ing both the quasi-course of employment i ssue and the 
negligence i s s u e . Judge Allen never analyzes the elements of 
neg l igence . If the Findings and Conclusions can somehow be 
construed as finding that the respondent was not negligent, the 
f indings are without support in the record and the Industr ia l 
Commission acted in excess of i t s powers in affirming that order. 
The evidence clearly establishes that respondent knew he suffered 
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a loss of feeling in his hand and, nevertheless, worked around 
extremely hot equipment and surfaces without taking any measures 
to protect his numb right hand. This was undeniably negligent on 
his part. 
CONCLUSION 
The only reasonable interpretation of Judge Allen's failure 
to discuss negligence is that he based his Order on the erroneous 
conclusion that respondent was engaged in a "quasi-course of 
employment" activity when he suffered the burns to his right 
hand. Quasi-course of employment activities are activities 
necessitated by the industrial accident. Clearly, neither working 
on a car, repairing a heater, or cooking is necessitated by an 
industrial accident. The respondent was not engaged in quasi-
course of employment activities when he was burned; therefore 
those burns are not compensable, if caused by his own negligence. 
Based on the record, the respondent was negligent res ipsa 
locquitur« If Judge Allen's Findings and Conclusion can somehow 
be construed as finding that the respondent was not negligent, 
that finding is completely without support in the record. 
Accordingly, appellant's requests that the Industrial 
Commission's Denial of Motion for Review ordering compensation for 
respondent's burn injury should be reversed. 
Finally, to allow Judge Allen's decision to stand would 
unwisely extend workmen's compensation insurance benefits to a 
class of injuries not reasonably related to the original compens-
able accident. Judge Allen's decision, in this regard, has 
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far-reaching impact on employers and insurance carriers alike. If 
not reversedf the ruling could effectively transform workmenfs 
compensation into broad line health insurance. This result is not 
consistent with the legislative intent or historical purpose of 
workmen's compensation* If such changes are needed, they should 
not be effected by the judiciary, but, rather, by legislative 
enactment• 
DATED this z% /A _ day of June, 1985. 
BLACK/& MOORE 
Q ^ ^ - u ^ _ -Q, .„=£, 
Dennis V. Lloyd 
In-House Legal Counsel 
State Insurance Fund 
-c3—< 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILIEQ 
I hereby certify that I mailed 4 true and exact copies of the 
foregoing Reply Brief, postage prepaid, this 
1985, to the following: 
-£• K. day of June, 
Mary C. Corporon 
Chris D. Nichols 
Boston Bldg., Suite 1100 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Stephen Schwendiman 
Assistant Attorney General 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114 
'-^iiclM^/' 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
